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DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF CHOICE OF LAW PROVISIONS
IN STEAMSHIP TICKETS: ADHESION CONTRACTS AND
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS*
IN nearly all jurisdictions parties to a contract may stipulate the law by
which their agreement is to be governed.' The only limitations placed by
courts on the parties' autonomy in choice of law are that the chosen law be
related to the transaction, 2 that the reason for adopting it be bona fide,3 and
that the results reached by use of the chosen law not violate the public policy
of the forum.4 But while it is usually clear that parties may stipulate the use
of the law of a foreign country, it is sometimes not clear to what extent such
a provision should govern subsequent dealings between the parties relating to
the contract. A recent case raises this problem, and presents the further ques-
tion of whether such a stipulation and other contractual provisions contained
in steamship tickets should be afforded special treatment because these tickets
are adhesion contracts.
*Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955).
1. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193 U.S. 551 (1904); Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts
in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUm. L. REv. 1072, 1073-74 (1953) ; Yntema, Contract and
Conflict of Laws: "Autonomy" in Choice of Law in the United States, 1 N.Y.L. FORum 46
(1955). But cf. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 332 (1934) which provides only that
the validity of a contract be determined by the lex loci contractus.
2. Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1927) ("normal relation");
Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Film Classics, Inc., 156 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1946) ("reasonable
relationship"); Owens v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows Co., 58 R.I. 162, 192 Atl. 158 (1937)
("real relation"). But see Duskin v. Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corp., 167 F.2d 727
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 829 (1948) (no limitation but "public policy").
3. Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse, supra note 2; Albritton v. General Finance Corp.,
204 F.2d 125 (SthCir. 1953) ; Yntema, Autonomy in Choice of Law, 1 Am. J. Comep. L. 341,
354 (1952). The requirement of bona fides appears, however, to be met when the stipulated
law bears a reasonable relationship to the transaction. See Seeman v. Philadelphia Ware-
house Co., supra.
4. Duskin v. Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corp., 167 F.2d 727 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 829 (1948) ; 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws 1116 (1935).
Exculpatory clauses reducing a vessel's liability for negligence to passengers are void
as against public policy, 49 STAT. 1480 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 183(c) (1952), even though
valid by the law stipulated in the contract. The Kensington, 183 U.S. 263 (1902) ; Oceanic
Steam Nay. Co. v. Corcoran, 9 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1925).
A carrier may limit its liability for damage to baggage only if it provides the passenger
with an option to insure the full value of the baggage. See Bachman v. Clyde S.S. Co.,
152 Fed. 403 (2d Cir. 1907); Cohn v. United States Lines Co., 84 F. Supp. 503 (D.N.J.
1949) ; Reichman v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 290 N.Y. 344, 49 N.E.2d 474
(1943). For discussion of option and consideration as grounds for the carrier's self-
exculpation from tort liability, see Note, 37 COLUm. L. Ry. 248, 250-55 (1937).
5. See notes 23-48 infra and accompanying text. See also Ehrenzweig, supra note 1)
at 1075.
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In Siegelnzan v. Cunard White Star Ltd.,, a passenger sued the steamship
company for damages resulting from a personal injury sustained aboard the
Queen Elizabeth during a trip from New York to Cherbourg. In a conversa-
tion with Siegelman's attorney eleven months after the accident, Cunard's New
York claim agent offered $800 in settlement of the passenger's claim. The
attorney agreed to inform his client of the offer, but indicated that he would
also institute suit against Cunard to prevent the bar of a one year limitation
of actions provision in the ticket. 7 The agent replied that the prospect of early
agreement made filing a complaint unnecessary. No complaint was filed and
no settlement was reached before the one year period expired. Three months after
it ended, Cunard's offer was revoked. Eleven months later plaintiff brought his
action which was dismissed in the lower court for the reason that the one year
limitation period had run and that the agent had no authority to waive the
provision.8
The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal, but on the grounds that a second
ticket provision stipulating that English law was to govern "all matters arising
on the contract" applied to the issue of waiver,9 and that under English law
defendant's agent had not waived the limitation provision.10 The court con-
6. 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955).
7. Provision 10 of the ticket reads in part:
"No suit, action or proceeding against the Company or the ship, or the Agcnt,
of either, shall be maintainable for loss of life of or bodily injury to any passenger
unless . . . (b) . . . the suit, action or proceeding is commenced within one year
from the day when the death or injury occurred."
Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 209 (2d Cir. 1955). By federal
statute the minimum permissible limitation period for such actions is one year. 49 Srxmi.
960 (1935), 46 U.S.C. § 183(b) (1952).
8. Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 1955). The lower
court relied on provision 11 of the ticket which reads in part:
"[ N ] o agreement, alteration or amendment creating any other or different liability
shall be valid unless made in writing and signed for the Company by its Chief Agent
at the port of embarkation."
Id. at 209.
9. Provision 20 of the ticket reads:
"All questions arising on this contract ticket shall be decided according to English
Law with reference to which this contract is made."
Ibid.
10. Id. at 198.
English law had been neither pleaded nor proved in the district court below. Id. at 196.
But the Second Circuit ruled that under FD. R. Cir. P. 8(a) foreign law need not be
pleaded. Then, by combining N.Y. Civ. PAc. Acr § 344-a (New York courts may take
judicial notice of the unproved law of a foreign country) and FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a)
(federal courts use state rather than federal admissibility rules if more favorable to the
reception of evidence), the court held that the unproved foreign law could be applied.
Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 196-97 (2d Cir. 1955).
Both before and since adoption of the present Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal
courts, in the absence of state statutes allowing judicial notice of the law of a foreign
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sidered it desirable to apply English law to the contract in order to honor the
parties' intent, and because choice of law provisions aid courts in settling con-
flict of laws questions and lead to uniform results in litigation. The court con-
cluded that since the parties intended that English law should govern the validity
and interpretation of the contract, it would be "unnatural" to assume that they
did not intend the same law to control the issue of waiver." Because, under the
court's interpretation of English law, the agent's conversation with plaintiff's
attorney did not constitute waiver of the limitation provision, the suit was dis-
missed.12 Judge Frank, dissenting, reasoned that, inter alia, steamship tickets
are contracts of adhesion and therefore should be strictly construed against the
drafter. Since there was doubt about whether the English law provision applied
to waiver, and since the federal law of waiver was more favorable to the passen-
ger than that of England, he would have applied federal law.1 3
country, have refused to apply such law unless pleaded and proved. E.g., Bonsalem v.
Byron S.S. Co., 50 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1931) ; Harris v. American Int'l Fuel and Petroleum
Co., 124 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Pa. 1954). Prior to the Siegelnan case, only two federal
courts had spoken on this issue where a state statute provided for judicial notice of the
law of a foreign country. In Empresa Agricola Chicamna Ltda. v. Amtorg Trading Corp.,
57 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), the court ruled that FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a) and N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. ACT § 344-a dispensed with the necessity of proving foreign law, but
not with the need for pleading it. But in Jansson v. Swedish American Line,
89 F. Supp. 557 (D. Mass.), rcv'd on other grounds, 185 F.2d 212 (1st Cir. 1950) the
court stated by way of dictum that under FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a) the foreign law need not
be pleaded.
Seven states now have statutes allowing judicial notice of the law of a foreign country.
McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 VAND. L. R.v. 296, 307 (1952). If Siegebnan is followed,
foreign law need not be pleaded in any federal court, but it must be proved in all but these
seven states. If the parties are given reasonable notice that a foreign law is to be applied,
there seems to be no valid justification for pleading and proving such law. See Keeffe,
Landis & Shaad, Sense and Nonsense about Judicial Notice, 2 STAN. L. REv. 664, 688-90
(1950).
11. Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 1955).
12. Id. at 198. The court relied on a rule of law formerly accepted by English courts
that representation of an intent to abandon a legal right will not create estoppel. Provident
Ace. & White Cross Ins. Co. v. Dahne, [1937] 2 All E.R. 255 (K.B.); Jorden v. Money,
5 H.L. 185, 10 Eng. Rep. 869 (1854) ; see Bank of Baroda, Ltd. v. Punjab Nat'l Bank, Ltd.,
f1944] A.C. 176 (P.C.). More recent cases, however, have held that an assurance or
promise intended to affect legal relations between parties and intended to be acted upon
becomes binding when the other party has acted in reliance. Robertson v. Minister of
Pensions, [1949] 1 K.B. 227 (1948) ; Ledingham v. Bermejo Estancia Co., [1947] 1 All
E.R. 749 (K.B.) ; Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd., [1947]
1 K.B. 130, 134 (1946) ("The law has not been standing still since Jorden v. Money.. .
see Note, 63 L.Q. REv. 283, 300 (1947), commenting on and approving the newer English
view.
But such an assurance or promise is binding only so far as its terms properly apply.
Ledingham v. Bermejo Estancia Co., supra; Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High
Trees House Ltd., supra. In the instant case, the assurance, being based on the excellent
chance for settlement, would probably cease to be binding within a reasonable time after
revocation of the settlement offer. Therefore plaintiff's suit, which was not commenced
until eleven months later, would probably still be barred by the limitation of actions clause.
13. Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 199 (2d Cir. 1955). But
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Even though English contract law was binding on the plaintiff, the majority's
application of English law to the issue of waiver is contrary to the usual holding
that parties do not intend foreign law provisions to extend to procedural mat-
ters.14 Statutes of limitation concerning common law actions are procedural
and are governed by the lex fori.15 And both contractual and non-contractual
exceptions to the bar of such statutes are governed by the lex fori on the
adhesion contract principles should not demand that the adherer win in every case. They
only require courts to overcome particular characteristics which prevent freedom of con-
tract. See text at notes 23-48 infra.
In addition to his adhesion contract argument, Judge Frank would reverse for several
other reasons: (1) English law as interpreted by the majority is against American public
policy; (2) the RESTATmIENT, CONFLICT Or LAWS § 373 (1934) shows persuasively that
American law should govern waiver; (3) English conflict of laws principles should be
applied, and these might permit consideration of American law of waiver; and (4) the
case cited by the majority opinion (Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. Craine, [1922] 2 A.C. 541 (P.C.))
does not bear out its conclusion that under English law defendant had not waived the
limitation provision.
Judge Frank's public policy determination is contrary to past cases. See cases cited note 4
supra. Since the Restatement does not recognize the intent of the parties as controlling,
see note 1 supra, it is valueless as authority where the issue is one of intent. See cases cited
note 14 infra. And since the English conflict of laws rule is to honor the intent of the
parties, Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., [1939] A.C. 277 (P.C.), and
English courts are prone to find that English law was intended to govern, 2 BEALE, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 1102, it is highly doubtful that an English court would apply American
law to the issue of waiver. As to the criticism of the majority's interpretation of English
law, see note 12 supra.
14. See Wood & Selick, Inc. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 43 F.2d 941 (2d
Cir. 1930); Dorff v. Taya, 194 App. Div. 278, 185 N.Y. Supp. 174 (1st Dep't 1920)
Yntema, "Avtonony" in Choice of Law, 1 Am. J. Comsp. L. 341, 353 (1952).
It may be argued that the above cases are not controlling because the procedural
matters with which they deal are not contract terms. But since the requisites of waiver
(other than authority to waive, see note 8 supra), are also a procedural question and Were
not present in the Siegelman ticket, that issue should be determined in accordance with the
cases cited above. Moreover, the limitation of actions provision is drafted strictly with
reference to American law, see note 7 supra, and it might be incongruous to treat a waiver
of the provision according to foreign law.
15. 3 BmAux, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1620. The statute is considered to limit the remedy
only. GoODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 240 (3d ed. 1949) ; RESTATEMENT, CONrLICr OF LAWS
§§ 603-04 (1934). But if the liability and the limitation are created by the same statute,
the limitation is usually said to be a substantive limitation of the right, and the limitation
of the forum is not applied. Wilson v. Massengill Co., 124 F.2d 666 (6th Cir.), cert. denicd,
316 U.S. 686 (1942) ; Calvin v. West Coast Power Co., 44 F. Supp. 783 (D. Ore. 1942) :
3 BEALE, op. cit. supra, at 1627. Contra, Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514
(1953), afirning 195 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1952) ; Cauley v. Massengill Co., 35 F. Supp. 371
(D. Tenn. 1940). But foreign statutory limitations are not used unless they specifically
qualify statutory rights. Compare Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451 (1904) ; Maki v. George 1.
Cooke Co., 124 F.2d 663 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 686 (1942) (specific qualifica-
tions), with Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955), 55 COLU1.




ground that these matters are also procedural. 16 Moreover, courts, in classify-
ing contractual limitations as either substantive or procedural, make the same
sort of analysis which they use in dealing with statutory limitations.' 7 Applying
traditional conflicts doctrine to Siegeman, therefore, waiver of the limitation of
actions provision in a negligence suit,' 8 where a statute of limitation would be
considered procedural, should also have been regarded as procedural and judged
by federal law.' 9
16. Contractual: Titus v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 134 F.2d 223 (5th
Cir. 1943) (validity of contractual waiver of the statute).
Non-contractual: Van Dyke v. Parker, 83 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1936) (tolling of statute
by letter acknowledging justness of adverse party's claim) ; Graham v. Englemann, 263
Fed. 166 (S.D. Tex. 1920) (tolling of statute by defendant's absence from jurisdiction) ;
Dunn Constr. Co. v. Bourne, 172 Miss. 620, 159 So. 841 (1935) (tolling of statute by suit
against another person jointly liable).
17. Substantive: compare Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1929), with Wilson
v. Massengill, 124 F.2d 666 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 686 (1942).
Procedural: compare Titus v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., supra note 16,
with State Compensations Ins. Fund v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 451 (E.D.
Pa. 1952).
18. Federal courts have never held this type of action to arise ex contractu, Jansson v.
Swedish American Line, 185 F.2d 212 (1st Cir. 1950) (maritime tort); Rosenthal v. Com-
pagnie Generale Transatlantique, 14 F.R.D. 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (negligence), notwith-
standing contrary state decisions involving nonmaritime claims, Dyke v. Erie Ry., 45 N.Y.
113 (1871); Strickler v. Palmer, 73 N.Y.S.2d 389, 190 Misc. 688 (Sup. Ct. 1947). The
federal position appears more tenable, since the duty to exercise due care extends to non-
paying passengers, Radermacher v. St. Paul City Ry., 214 Minn. 427, 8 N.W.2d 466 (1943) ;
Parker v. Bissonette, 203 S.C. 155, 26 S.E.2d 497 (1943), although the duty to these
passengers may be expressly waived, Kansas City So. Ry. v. Van Zant, 260 U.S. 459
(1923); Stevens v. Colombian Mail S.S. Corp., 15 F. Supp. 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1936);
Anderson v. Erie R.R., 223 N.Y. 277, 119 N.E. 557 (1918).
Whether a maritime action in a federal court is instituted on grounds of original or
diversity jurisdiction, federal maritime law must be applied. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn,
346 U.S. 406 (1953) ; Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918). In Siegel-
man v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955), this principle led the court
to apply federal rather than state conflict of laws rules. See also Jansson v. Swedish
American Line, supra. But where there is no federal law on the issue, a state statute may
be applied. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955) ; Comment,
50 Nw. U.L. REv. 677 (1955). In a maritime action a state court may not apply its own
common law if that conflicts with the federal maritime law. Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sand-
anger, 259 U.S. 255 (1922); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, supra at 409-10 (dictum).
Brit see Caldarola v. Eckert, 332 U.S. 155 (1947) ; Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, srpra at
414, 418 (concurring opinion). And a state court must apply an applicable federal statute,
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942), but within a limited area may
apply its own statute where that does not conflict with federal law, C. J. Hendry Co. v.
Moore, 318 U.S. 133 (1943).
19. Under federal law plaintiff would probably not be barred by the limitation of
actions provision. Federal admiralty courts have held that estoppel to plead a contractual
limitation is created when the behavior of one party induces the other to refrain from
bringing suit. Scheibel v. Agwilines, Inc., 156 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1946) ; Green Star S.S.
Co. v. Nanyang Bros. Tobacco Co., 3 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1925) ; DeFarconnet v. Western
Ins. Co., 110 Fed. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1901), aff'd, 122 Fed. 448 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 190
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Nor do the court's reasons for honoring the English law stipulation justify
its extension to the issue of waiver. Although in some situations choice of law
provisions may eliminate the burden of resolving conflict of laws questions, the
provision here necessitated interpretation of English waiver law which was
unfamiliar both to the court and to one of the parties.20 And while uniformity
of results in litigation is desirable to avoid disappointing the expectations of
the parties,21 application of the ambiguous English law provision in Siegelnzan
frustrated plaintiff's reasonable expectation that the limitations clause had been
waived.2 2 Moreover, in future cases American parties concerned with similar
questions will be required to govern their conduct by a foreign law.
The Siegehnan case raises the broader issue of whether steamship tickets
should be treated as ordinary contracts or as contracts of adhesion. The ma-
jority opinion, in considering the conflict of laws question, applies standard
contract doctrine to the ticket. This contrasts sharply with the dissent which
U.S. 558 (1903). A contractual limitation, once tolled, does not revive. Semmes v. Hart-
ford Fire Ins. Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 158 (1871) ; Lynchburg Cotton Mill Co. v. Travelers'
Ins. Co., 149 Fed. 954 (4th Cir. 1906).
In Siegelinan the inference can be drawn from the conversation between defendant's
agent and plaintiff's attorney that the inducement to refrain from bringing suit was the
chance of a better settlement. Evidently, Cunard desired settlement of the claim to pro-
mote good will. Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 1955).
20. The burden on the court of applying foreign law has usually been considered a
factor favoring the use of the lex fori. 3 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1599; Ailes,
Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 39 MICH. L. REv. 392, 417 (1941). See
Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 1955), where Judge Harlan
declined to apply the Panama statute of limitation partly because of unwillingness to f _,rce
American courts to examine "the unfamiliar peculiarities and refinements of different
foreign legal systems." Perhaps some distinction may be drawn between civil law and
common law countries. See ibid. And undoubtedly the burden on the court in the Sicgehlan
case was further lightened by its training in English law. See WHo's WHo Im A.MIERICA
1129 (1954-55). But see note 12 supra.
The added burden on the parties' attorneys of proving foreign law has also been used
to justify the application of the lex fori. Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., supra at 154;
3 BE-LE, op. cit. supra, at 1599; Ailes, supra, at 417. Furthermore, it would seem that
where the foreign company is one operating extensively in the United States, the burden
on the American party and his attorney is a disproportionate one.
21. EZSTAT ENT, CONFLICt OF LAws, c. 12 Introductory Note (1934); GooDRICH,
,op. cit. supra note 15, at 8; 1 RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE S-fuDY 87
(1945) ; see 1 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 46-47.
22. Since waiver of the clause should have been a procedural matter, plaintiff'
attorney could have relied on the fact that the remarks of the Cunard agent constituttd
waiver under federal law. See notes 14-19 supra and accompanying text. And since the ticket
provision limiting the agent's authority to waive was concerned only with the alteration
of substantive rights, see note 8 supra, it should not have restricted his authority with regard
to this procedural matter.
It could also be argued that waiver is equivalent to a new contract, and therefore, that
the English law clause relating to matters arising "on the contract," see note 9 supra, was
inapplicable. But as with the procedural-substantive distinction, whether English law
applies would depend on the intent of the contracting parties. See cases cited note 14 supra.
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views such tickets as adhesion contracts and therefore subject to special treat-
ment.23 Adhesion contracts are agreements in which one party, in order to
contract with another, must accept a formalized document prepared by the
other.24  Several significant characteristics are often associated with these
contracts: provisions may be one-sided because drafting is done solely by the
stronger party ;25 the terms are typically in technical language and small print 26
and are not read by the adherer ;27 any detailed "intent" ascribed to him is gen-
erally fictional ;28 and he usually has no opportunity to obtain different condi-
tions by contracting elsewhere.29 Numerous authorities have emphasized these
characteristics in concluding that all adhesion contracts require distinctive
treatment.3 " Some have urged that standard contract doctrine, based as it is
on the "intent of the parties," is wholly irrelevant.31
The factors generally associated with adhesion contracts are often found in
steamship tickets, and some courts seem to have been influenced by these factors
in circumventing ticket provisions to benefit passenger-adherers.3 2 But the courts
have been inconsistent in their use of such special treatment 3 3 and have failed
23. Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 204 (2d Cir. 1955).
24. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REv. 198, 222
(1919). Other commentators have incorporated additional elements into their definition
of adhesion contracts. See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Free-
dona of Contract, 43 COLUm. L. Ra,. 629, 632 (1943) ; Sales, Standard Form Contracts,
16 MODERiN L. Rrv. 318, 319 (1953). For ease of analysis Patterson's earlier definition
is here adopted and these additional elements and other characteristics are reserved for
separate discussion. See text at notes 34-48 infra.
25. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704,
731-37 (1931) ; Sales, supra note 24, at 321-23; Note, 63 HARV. L. REV. 494 (1950) ; see
Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L. REv. 553, 587-89 (1933).
26. Mellinkoff, How to Make Contracts Illegible, 5 STAN. L. Rav. 418 (1953); Note,
r,3 HArv. L. REv. 494 (1950).
27. Note, 210 L.T. 351 (1950) ; Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. Ray. 700, 704
(1939). See also authorities cited note 26 supra.
23. See Jansson v. Swedish American Lines, 185 F.2d 212, 219 (1st Cir. 1950) ; Kessler,
supra note 24, at 632; Sales, supra note 24, at 318; cf. Wright, Opposition of the Law to
Business Usages, 26 COLUm. L. REv. 917, 930 (1926).
29. Kessler, supra note 24, at 632; Wright, supra note 28, at 930; Note, 58 YALE L.J.
1161, 1162 (1949).
30. See Bekken v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 70 N.D. 122, 143, 293 N.W. 200,
212 (1940) ; Kessler, supra note 24, at 640-42; Sales, supra note 24, at 337-42; Llewellyn,
Book Review, 52 HARV. L. Ray. 700, 704 (1939).
31. Sugar v. London Midland & Scottish Ry. Co., [1941] 1 All E.R. 172 (K.B. 1940);
Kessler, supra note 24, at 636.
32. Burstein v. United States Lines, Co., 134 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1943) ("claim for bodily
injury" in 49 STArt. 960, (1935), 46 U.S.C. § 183(b) (1952) held to include medical ex-
rin cs and loss of services, thereby invalidating six months limitation provision) ; Scire
v. American Export Line, Inc., 197 Misc. 422, 93 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (invalid
blanket exculpation clause in baggage receipt held to void valid provision in ticket issued
earlier).
33. In Baron v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 108 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1939), a
provision requiring that written notice of a claim be given to the purser before debarkation
,,r to the carrier within fifteen days of injury was held to bar the passenger's action. The
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to formulate express rules for its application. 34
The single circumstance that a passenger must "take-or-leave" the formalized
document of a company seems insufficient to justify affording him a preferred
status. But unique treatment is necessary to avoid oppressive consequences
resulting from particular characteristics of steamship ticket transactions.
Ticket drafting by steamship companies, whose bargaining ability greatly
exceeds that of passengers, may lead to provisions which are unfair,35 even
if not contrary to public policy, and when this occurs, courts should use the
equitable doctrine of unconscionable bargain to avoid harsh results. To a
greater extent than the public policy restriction, the unconscionable bargain
doctrine allows courts, in determining the enforceability of contract provisions,
to consider the circumstances existing at the time of the making of a contract.3 0
court was unimpressed by the fact that the passenger had spoken to the purser about
her injury, that the purser had told her she need not further notify the company and had
taken notes of her report, and that the passenger had written a letter one day after de-
barkation cancelling the return voyage because of her injury. And in Secoulsky v. Oceanic
Steam Nay. Co., 223 Mass. 465, 112 N.E. 151 (1915), the passenger was held to a $50
limitation of liability provision, even though he could not read or write English and, upon
asking the company's ticket agent whether he should insure, was informed that insurance
was unnecessary. See also Murray v. Cunard S.S. Co., 235 N.Y. 162, 139 N.E. 226
(1923); Rosenthal v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 170 Misc. 426, 12 N.Y.S.2d
102 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
For a striking contrast in approach in a single case, compare the majority and dissenting
opinions in Reichmann v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 290 N.Y. 344, 352, 49 N.E.2d
474, 477 (1943).
34. Whether or not courts give special treatment to these tickets, they generally fail
to verbalize any distinction between them and standard contracts. See cases cited in notes
32-33 supra. The circuitous methods used by the courts in dealing with adhesion contracts
in general have been variously characterized as "interpretation," 1 Co BIN, CONTRACTS §
128 (1950), "recovery by the back door," Kessler, supra note 24, at 635, and "semi-covert
techniques," Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv. L. REv. 700, 702 (1939). For a novel
approach wherein the court ignored a limitation of liability provision, see Klar v. H. & 'M.
Parcel Room, Inc., 296 N.Y. 1044, 73 N.E.2d 912 (1947). All these methods have been
criticized as an ineffective long range solution. Kessler, supra, at 633; Llewellyn, supra,
at 703; Note, 58 YALE L.J. 1161, 1170-71 (1949).
35. An example of such a provision is one which, after partially exculpating the carrier
from liability for damage to baggage, provides the passenger with an option to insure the
excess baggage at the rate of 5% of its value. Such a provision does not contravene
public policy. See Goddard, Contract Limitations of the Common Carrier's Liability, 8
MICH. L. REv. 531, 544 (1910). At the present time, however, most steamship companies
charge only 1% for such excess baggage, but at least one charges 5%. See Letters from
steamship companies to Yale Law Journal, Dec. 2-22, 1955, on file in Yale Law Library.
For provisions which are against public policy, see The Kensington, 183 U.S. 263
(1902) ; Oceanic Steam Nay. Co. v. Corcoran, 9 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1925) ; Barndt v. Det
Bergenske Dampskibsselskab, 28 F. Supp. 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
36. See UNIFORm COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 & comment; 1 CORBIN, CoNmRAcrs § 128
(1950) ; Note, 63 YALE L.J. 560 (1954).
Another disadvantage of the public policy doctrine is that courts are often reluctant to
extend it to new areas. J. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUTNcTioN OF LAw 494-504 (1946).
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Application of this doctrine, already extensively used by courts of admiralty,3 7
would permit evaluation of such factors as a passenger's inability to comprehend
oppressive consequences of involved provisions or the unavailability elsewhere
of different terms even where such consequences are clear from the ticket
itself.
An important consideration in deciding whether to hold passengers to the
terms of steamship tickets which are not unconscionable is the fact that many
passengers do not read their tickets.3 8 Some federal courts have held that
before a passenger will be bound by a provision the company must not only
incorporate the term into the ticket by reference, but must also give the pas-
senger notice of it.3 9 Siegelman, however, apparently follows the more prevalent
rule that sufficient incorporation alone will make provisions binding.40 Incor-
poration probably affords a passenger sufficient notice where knowledge of a
provision, such as the limitation of actions clause in the Siegelman contract,
would probably not influence his acceptance of a ticket or his behavior prior
37. Many admiralty decisions have applied an unconscionable bargain rationale to in-
validate salvage contracts whose unfair terms were traceable to the parties' manifestly
unequal bargaining power. E.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. National Oil Transp. Co., 281
Fed. 336 (S.D. Tex. 1922), modified, 286 Fed. 40 (5th Cir. 1923); Spreckels v. The
Don Carlos, 47 Fed. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1891); The Young America, 20 Fed. 926 (D.N.J.
1884).
38. See, e.g., Oceanic Steam Nay. Co. v. Corcoran, 9 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1925) ; Rogers
v. Furness, Withy & Co., 103 F. Supp. 314 (W.D.N.Y. 1951).
Failure to read a contract is ordinarily no defense unless there is misrepresentation.
3 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 607 (1950) ; Note, 28 NORE DAmE LAw. 136 (1952). But the
undesirability of this rule as applied to the standard contract form has been recognized.
Sec Mellinkoff, supra note 26, at 432 (suggesting a rebuttable presumption of nonreading
where the type is below a certain size) ; Sales, supra note 24, at 337-42 (advocating legis-
lative preparation of all standard form contracts to protect the nonreading adherer) ; Note,
210 L.T. 351 (1950) (raising the question whether terms in the "standard form" contract
not previously discussed by the parties should be stricken out). Many states have statutes
regulating the type-size of insurance contracts. E.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 164(2).
39. Azrak v. Panama Canal Co., 117 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); see The Kungs-
holm, 86 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1936); cf. Foster v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 121 F.2d 12
(2d Cir. 1941).
40. Isthmian S.S. Co. v. 1fcElligott, 177 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1949) ; Jansson v. Swedish
American Line, 89 F. Supp. 557 (D. Mass.), rev'd on other grounds, 185 F.2d 212 (1st
Cir. 1950) ; Cohn v. United States Lines Co., 84 F. Supp. 503 (D.N.J. 1949).
The court in Siegelinan held only that these tickets are contracts and that their pro-
visions are binding. Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 193 (2d Cir.
1955). The absence of a discussion of notice appears to indicate that the court considered
proof of notice irrelevant.
New York state courts have consistently held that tickets are contracts and that notice
'iq irrelevant. E.g., Murray v. Cunard S.S. Co., 235 N.Y. 162, 139 N.E. 226 (1923);
Rasmussen v. Gdynia America Lines, Ltd., 126 N.Y.S.2d 872 (Sup. Ct. 1953). And some
federal courts have relied on these state decisions in holding notice irrelevant. Horvath v.
Cunard S.S. Co., 103 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1953); Rogers v. Furness, Withy & Co.,
103 F. Supp. 314 (W.D.N.Y. 1951) (dictum). However, in admiralty only the general
body of maritime law as enunciated by federal courts is controlling. See note 18 mspra.
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to contemplation of litigation.41 But where knowledge of a clause, such as a
warning to insure baggage, 42 might affect a passenger's conduct prior to seeking
legal advice, a showing that he had the opportunity to read his ticket should
be necessary to hold him to the term. The opportunity to read, however, is
ineffectual if reading a provision is an unreasonable burden because it is con-
tained in small print or is spaced closely. Since notice is imputed to a person
only because he should have discovered information through reasonable dili-
gence,43 the reasonableness under the circumstances of requiring that a ticket pro-
vision be read should be an additional issue. 44
The basic fallacy involved in applying standard contract doctrine to steam-
ship tickets is that the "intent of the parties"-the purported basis for enforce-
ment of consensual agreements-is usually nonexistent. A passenger seeking
terms different from those offered by the company may not be able to obtain
41. It is difficult to imagine that either the one year limitation provision, see note
7 supra, or the choice of law provision, see note 9 supra, would have influenced plaintiff's
desire to book passage aboard the Queen Elizabeth or altered his subsequent behavior
prior to consulting his attorney. Where a ticket provision is of this nature, the only
notice needed is to the passenger's attorney that the provision is part of a contract. And
sufficient incorporation affords this notice. However, since contract is a consensual arrange-
ment, a showing by a passenger that knowledge of any provision would have influenced
his behavior should free him from its effects if he had no notice of it.
42. See provision 6 of the Cunard ticket reprinted in Siegelman v. Cunard White
Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 208 (2d Cir. 1955). Also in this category are provisions requiring
notice of the passenger's claim within a short period of time and provisions limiting the
authority of the carrier's agents. See provisions 10(a) and 11 of the Cunard ticket reprinted
in id. at 209. These or similar provisions appear in substantially all steamship tickets. See
note 45 infra.
Another feature peculiar to steamship ticket transactions is that passengers are often
required to surrender their contracts before their voyage begins. See, e.g., Rogers v.
Furness, Withy & Co., 103 F. Supp. 314 (W.D.N.Y. 1951); Murray v. Cunard S.S. Co.,
235 N.Y. 162, 139 N.E. 226 (1923). Consequently, where knowledge of a provision is
necessary after that time, earlier notice of that provision is ineffective unless it has been
memorized by the passenger. In such a situation, giving the passenger the ticket originally
should not be considered notice.
43. 1 MERRILL, NOTIcE § 70 (1952). The rationale for holding the nonreader to the
terms of the contract is either that "he is estopped by his 'negligence,' or that he must
suffer the consequences of his 'folly'. . . ." 3 CORBIN, CoNTRAcTs § 607 (1950).
44. There are accurate standards for determining "constructive illegibility." Psycho-
logical reading studies show that for ,ordinary reading material eleven-point type is the
most desirable; type under nine-point is unsatisfactory; and type under six-point is illegible
from the standpoint of ordinary ease of reading. Mellinkoff, supra note 26, at 419. The text
of this Note is printed in ten-point type, the footnotes in eight-point. Steamship ticket pro-
visions range from five-point to eight-point type. See Letters from steamship companies to
the Yale Law Journal, Dec. 2-22, 1955, on file in Yale Law Library. It is suggested that if
a provision is one which should be brought to the attention of passengers, see text at note
42 supra, there should be a rebuttable presumption of nonreading where type is under nine-
point. See Mellinkoff, supra note 26, at 432. And where the type size is greater than nine-
point, unreasonable crowding should create the same rebuttable presumption. For an ex-
ample of close spacing, see the Cunard ticket reprinted in Siegelman v. Cunard White Star
Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 208-09 (2d Cir. 1955).
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them by bargaining or by contracting elsewhere. 45 At other times his inex-
pertness may prevent him from comprehending the significance of his agree-
ment. In both cases a passenger's acceptance of a ticket clause may be a sub-
mission to the will of the company rather than an expression of his intent.4 6
A good example of this is Siegelman, for it is most unlikely that when the
passenger bought his ticket he had any intention concerning application of
English law to the question of waiver.
The relevant intention of the parties is that indicated by their subsequent
behavior, not a standardized, fictional intent inferred from mere acceptance of a
document. Only during negotiations which follow a dispute does a passenger
have the opportunity to seek a variation of the standard contract. And only at
that time does mutuality of intent enter the contractual relationship. Therefore,
where subsequent behavior inconsistent with a ticket provision demonstrates
an intention by the parties to create a new agreement, tailored to meet the needs
of the individual situation, the company should not be allowed to rely on an
earlier ticket provision.4 7 In Siegelman, for example, the court should have
determined the law applicable to the issue of waiver by examining the parties'
behavior during negotiations. Such an approach would have led to the applica-
tion of American law, since the passenger's attorney intended American law
to govern, and Cunard acquiesced in this view.48
45. It seems apparent that it does not occur to most passengers to bargain about any
terms of the contract other than price and accommodations. However, an attempt to
bargain would in any event probably be unsuccessful. Most transatlantic steamship tickets
contain substantially the same provisions. The minimum notice requirement of six months
and limitation of actions period of one year, established by 49 STAT. 960 (1935), 46 U.S.C.
§ 183 (b) (1952) for causes of action regulated by this section, are in all tickets. For causes
of action not regulated by § 183(b) the limitation period varies from four to six months
and the notice requirement from fifteen days to two months. All companies strictly define
requisites for waiver of contract provisions. Requirements range from no waiver possible
by any subsequent action of company employees to waiver possible only in writing by
a specific agent of the company. The limitation of liability for damage to baggage is
ubiquitous, the amount varying from $50 to $250, and the rate of insurance for excess
baggage varying from 1% to 5% of its value. See Letters from steamship companies to
Yale Law Journal, Dec. 2-22, 1955, on file in Yale Law Library. The passenger does,
however, have his choice of law, for most companies prefer to stipulate no law or to apply
their own law to questions arising on their contracts. Ibid.
A similar disparity in bargaining ability exists where, although other companies do
provide different terms, market conditions make it impossible for a passenger to book
passage elsewhere.
46. See authorities cited note 28 supra.
47. By provisions which limit the possiblity of waiver steamship companies have at-
tempted to preclude such holdings. See note 45 supra. And they have usually been successful.
See Scheibel v. Agwilines, Inc., 156 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1946) ; Baron v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 108 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1939); Eichler v. Furness, Withy & Co., 169 Misc.
22, 6 N.Y.S.2d 893 (N.Y. City Ct. 1938). But the Siegelman case indicates that courts
may be beginning to use the doctrine of apparent authority to find waiver from the conduct
of company agents. Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 197-98 (2d Cir.
1955).
48. Cunard's express revocation of its offer after expiration of the limitation period
implies that it considered its agent's prior actions to constitute waiver. The fact that Cunard
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The suggestion of the dissent that steamship tickets be treated specially
should not be ignored. When those characteristics of adhesion contracts which
cause injustice are present in steamship ticket transactions, the application of
standard contract doctrine is unsuitable. Instead courts should apply distinc-
tive treatment designed to strike at the cause of particular oppressive traits.
But without these qualities the "take it or leave it" nature of the transaction
does not justify judicial abandonment of conventional contract law.
did not plead English law when the action was before the district court, see note 10 supra,
supports the further inference that at the time of negotiations it did not consider its agent's
behavior governed by English law.
